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Introduction & Organization  
The U.S. electricity transmission infrastructure is undergoing historic change; a short, upfront look 
at current and projected investment activity provides a sense of the scale and impact.  Under the 
auspice of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, the Department of Energy is authorized 
to award nearly $38 billion in grants—and make or guarantee $127 billion in loans—over the next 
few years to modernize the United States’s energy infrastructure and pursue a more independent 
national energy policy.2  Roughly 14% of the authorized grant money, or $4.5 billion, is 
specifically directed towards Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, a category focused on 
upgrading the U.S. electricity transmission grid.3  In practice, many of those grants are to be 
matched, dollar for dollar, by private investment.4  Similar priorities are reflected in the regular 
budget process as illustrated by the 2011 fiscal budget which features a 6.8 percent increase for the 
Department of Energy’s budget, to $28.4 billion, and a 5 percent increase for the Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy, to $2.36 billion.5
Apart from federal departmental budgets and stimulus grant spending, regional investment in 
transmission upgrades continues unabated and, in terms of aggregate investment, may outstrip the 
federal stimulus grant awards.  In Texas alone, a $4.93 billion transmission line build-out gained 
approval in early 2009 and is set to begin construction later this year.
 
6  That project was followed 
by an announcement at the end of December 2009 that the regional operator for the Texas grid is 
considering another slate of projects over the next five years that would be worth over $8.2 
billion.7
                                                        
2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL REPORT: THE AMERICAN 
RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, at 1 [hereinafter Special Report], 
available at http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/OAS-RA-09-01-New508-G.pdf.  The Department of 
Energy’s final rules on the loan guarantee guidelines were released in early December of 2009.  See U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ISSUES FINAL RULE ON LOAN GUARANTEES, 
http://www.energy.gov/news2009/8369.htm [Last Visited Jan. 14, 2009]. 
   
3 See Special Report, supra note 1. 
4 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, RECOVERY ACT SELECTIONS FOR SMART GRID INVESTMENT AWARDS 
– BY CATEGORY, available at 
http://www.energy.gov/recovery/smartgrid_maps/SGIGSelections_Category.pdf.  
5 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT – FISCAL YEAR 2011 at 69, 
70, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/budget.pdf.  
6 See Press Release - Public Utility Commission of Texas, Texas Public Utility Commission Approves 
Wind Transmission Plan (July 17, 2008) [hereinafter PUCT July Press Release], available at http://See 
www.puc.state.tx.us/nrelease/2008/071708.pdf. 
7 See ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, REPORT ON EXISTING AND POTENTIAL ELECTRIC SYSTEM 
CONSTRAINTS AND NEEDS – DECEMBER 2009, at 7, available at 
http://www.ercot.com/news/presentations/2009/2009_Constraints_and_Needs_Report_21DEC2009.pdf 
(proposals include plans to build over 5,729 miles of transmission lines). 
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Recent reports from the world of venture capital investment also signal continued strength in the 
broad area of “clean tech.” Clean tech is an area which drives demand for transmission and 
distribution infrastructure by funding innovative projects from plug-in cars to electricity 
monitoring software to renewable electricity generation.  The final numbers from 2009 show that 
nearly 25% of all venture capital dollars went into clean tech investments for a total of over $5.6 
billion, with deal volume at 557 transactions.8
As much as the magnitude of this public and private investment is noteworthy, the physical 
impacts of the actual construction of the transmission facilities may be even more so.  For 
example, the $4.93 billion Texas transmission project (mentioned above) will add an estimated 
2,200 miles of transmission lines and facilities in the state of Texas alone.
  
9  At least one study 
forecasts that over 56,000 acres of wildlife habitat will be affected by the resulting construction.10
Why is there such an intense contemporary focus on the seemingly staid area of electricity 
transmission infrastructure?  In short, the construction build-out is largely predicated on a national 
will to develop centralized renewable energy generation.  Centralized energy generation refers to 
the huge wind and solar power plants which—unlike distributed energy devices such as rooftop 
solar panels—require transmission links to populated areas.
  
Considering that there are similar planned and ongoing projects throughout the nation, it is not 
hyperbole to state that the national transmission infrastructure build-out will change the visual 
appearance of the country. 
11
                                                        
8 Press Release, Cleantech Group LLC and Deloitte LLP, Clean Technology Venture Investment Totaled 
$5.6 Billion in 2009 Despite Non-Binding Climate Change Accord in Copenhagen, Finds the Cleantech 
Group and Deloitte (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/clean-technology-venture-
investment-totaled-56-billion-in-2009-despite-non-binding-climate-change-accord-in-copenhagen-finds-the-
cleantech-group-and-deloitte-80796417.html.  
  Commentators offer myriad reasons 
to justify this desire, ranging from providing for national security and environmental protection to 
creating sustainable economic development.  Whatever the reasons, it is an inescapable reality that 
the continued deployment of centralized renewable energy resources, such as utility-scale wind 
and solar power plants, is currently dependent on the development of, and integration with, a more 
9 See PUCT July Press Release, supra note 4; Public Utility Commission of Texas, Docket 35665 
(March 2009).  
10 Estimate based on 200 foot right-of-ways.  See Lorie Woodward Cantu, Texas High Wires – A 
Balancing Act for Private Landowners, Texas Wildlife at 26 (July, 2009), available at http://texas-
wildlife.org/files/Texas%20High%20Wires%20article,%20electronic%20copy,%206-12-09.pdf. 
11 An alternate policy supported by some commentators is to create more distributed power generation 
through the use of rooftop solar panels, geothermal pumps, efficiency improvements, and single-home sized 
wind turbines.  Because these devices create power at the site of their ultimate consumption, the wide-ranging 
transmission infrastructure currently being contemplated would arguably not be necessary.  Proponents of 
centralized energy, however, question whether these distributed devices are cost-effective and capable of 
meeting the aggressive national renewable energy generation goals.  Others argue that both approaches are 
necessary to address the looming problem of climate change and the goal of energy independence.    
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robust U.S. electricity transmission infrastructure.12
This paper is meant to provide a timely introduction and an edited currency review of 
developments in this pivotal area of electricity transmission development.  With the considerable 
range and technical depth of transmission-related activity, however, only selective coverage is 
provided so as to maintain a palatable introduction.  The first two sections of this paper both 
feature the topic of planning (although it is often treated separately in other writings) to highlight 
why planning issues cannot be easily divorced from the business of managing a more integrated 
grid, or the siting of its transmission facilities.  Section I tackles the planning and managing of the 
grid and provides background on the structure and controversies affecting its development.  
Section II examines planning and physical siting of the transmission lines and substations, i.e., a 
review of the developments related to questions of where to place the physical facilities, and on 
whose land.  Rather than being a simple technical exercise, planning and siting decisions are 
interwoven with strong conflicts between competing federal and state authorities, as well as 
individual landowners.  Each of these sections is augmented with a relevant case example from the 
state of Texas, followed by a review of select recent issues from other areas of the country that 
illustrate larger themes.  The paper ends with a brief third section providing an initiation to the 
Smart Grid, a separate, incomplete, solution to the current energy challenges. 
  Insofar as that dependency persists—and the 
United States’s energy strategy remains focused on centralized generation—both the energy policy 
goals of the U.S. and, to some extent, the larger international goals of combating global climate 
change, are bound to the continued development of the U.S. electricity transmission network. 
The choice of Texas for the case example perhaps requires a brief upfront explanation.  In addition 
to simple partisanship, Texas was chosen because it is unique in regard to electricity transmission 
issues.  Due to quirks in the history of transmission development in the U.S., Texas is the site of a 
nearly self-contained transmission grid, and it has been at the forefront of operative electricity 
deregulation.  Moreover, it is the state with the most wind energy generation nationwide and, as a 
result, confronted certain problems with limits in transmission capacity earlier than many other 
states.  Because of these and other attributes to be later discussed, Texas provides a mostly self-
contained case example and a workable comparative context for developments that are happening 
nationwide.
                                                        
12 Generally speaking, there are two reasons centralized renewable energy generation is linked to a more 
robust electricity transmission network.  First, electricity generation from wind and solar resources is only 
intermittently available—the sun only shines for part of the day to fuel solar panels, and the uneven 
atmospheric heating from solar radiation does not generally create steady, all-day winds in specific locales.  
Second, commercially feasible electricity storage is not currently available.  Thus, the electricity generated 
from wind and solar resources is not always available to meet consumer demand and, when it is, it must be 
immediately transmitted for consumption otherwise it is wasted. Building additional transmission lines and 
facilities is one approach to addressing these obstacles. 








I. Planning and Management of the Transmission Grid 
 
The U.S. electricity grid features an estimated 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines 
and another 5.5 million miles of local distribution lines altogether worth in excess of $1 trillion 
dollars.13
Structure of the Grid 
  This system is the network of wires and related facilities on which our modern society 
depends.  The pressing question today is whether the planning and management of this vast 
infrastructure requires more centralized (federal) control. 
Although the U.S. transmission infrastructure is vast, it is not accurate to reference a single unified 
national transmission grid.  Rather, there are three separate asynchronous grids—the Western 
Interconnection, the Texas Interconnection, and the Eastern Interconnection—that cumulatively 
make up the U.S. transmission grid.14  This circumstance reflects a fragmented history of 
monopolistic and vertically-integrated utility companies building and managing transmission 
facilities to deliver their generated electricity to consumers.15  The utilities’ respective electricity 
delivery monopolies ensured a captive market for the sale of their electricity generation: utilities 
would build the transmission lines and local customers would pay for the construction costs 
through increases in their monthly electricity charges.  State governments acquiesced to these so-
called “natural” monopolies and sought to regulate pricing, construction, and management of 
utility operations.16
 
  As time advanced—and utilities merged or formed joint ventures—a wider 
unsystematic grid began taking shape and eventually developed into three main grids with control 
of individual transmission facilities residing with the local utility. 
 
                                                        
13 ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE GREEN GRID – ENERGY SAVINGS AND CARBON EMISSION 
REDUCTIONS ENABLED BY A SMART GRID (2008), available at 
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/uploads/1/SGNR_2009_EPRI_Green_Grid_June_2008.pdf. 
14 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Energy, Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/de/us_power_grids.html.  
15 See, e.g., M. GRANOVETTER, P. MCGUIRE, THE MAKING OF AN INDUSTRY: ELECTRICITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, IN MICHEL CALLON,  EDITOR, THE LAW OF MARKETS, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, pp. 147-173. 
16 Id.  These were natural monopolies in the sense that the costs associated with creating the 
transmission infrastructure necessary to provide electricity to consumers were quite high and it was thought 
inefficient to have consumers pay for duplicative infrastructure from a competing utility.  Further, generation 
capabilities in the early years of electricity generation were decidedly local.  As a result, electricity delivery 
was thought to naturally be the exclusive purview of a single operator, local generation company.   








Towards Regional Management of the Transmission Infrastructure 
Changes to the long-standing utility monopoly arrangement began at the federal level in 1978 but 
only gained serious momentum in the past decade.17  Congress pushed this process by enacting the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 with an intent to remove impediments to competition in the wholesale 
market.18  Four years later, in 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) 
responded by issuing Orders 888 and 889 which sought, in part, to provide open access to 
transmission facilities for all entities, not just those utilities that already owned and supplied 
generation.19  These Orders were intended to provide the foundation for competitive wholesale 
power markets, in contrast to the monopoly control of the past.20  Roughly contemporaneously, 
many states made a parallel effort to also develop retail competition for electricity consumers by 
opening up the transmission infrastructure to all generators.  Retail competition was similarly 
intended to foster competition by allowing local customers to choose their electricity provider 
regardless of their geographic service area within the state.21
Three years later, in 1999, FERC looked to extend its earlier efforts at opening the transmission 
infrastructure by issuing Order 2000.  This order encouraged all transmission-owning entities, 
private or public, to timely place their transmission facilities under the control of a regional 
transmission organization or an independent system operator.
   
22  In its explanation of the new rule, 
FERC cited its continued concern that the vertically-integrated utilities that owned and controlled 
transmission facilities were still discriminating against third-party generation companies that 
needed access to the utilities’ transmission facilities in order to deliver electricity to consumers.23
                                                        
17 In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617 ,which, in 
relevant part, sought to open the power markets to non-utility producers of energy and required utilities to 
purchase power from non-utility producers. 
  
FERC’s proposed regional management structures were intended to address this concern by 
providing independent management of the transmission facilities separate from the business of 
18 H.R. 776, Energy Power Act of 2002, Sec. 722. 
19 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory  
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public  
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 FR 21,540 (May 10, 1996). 
20 Id.  
21 See STATE OF TEXAS, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ELECTRIC CHOICE, available at 
http://www.powertochoose.org/_files/_pdf/ConsumerGuide_eng.pdf (In Texas retail electricity consumers 
can choose their retail electricity provider regardless of their physical location). 
22 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 18 CFR Part 35 / Order No. 2000 (Dec. 20, 1999), available 
at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm99-2-00k.pdf.  FERC maintained flexibility for the 
industry participants to determine how to compose these organizations, although each regional organization 
was required to meet a minimum number of characteristics, including exhibiting Independence and 
Operational Authority.  Such organizations further were required to perform a minimum number of functions, 
including Tariff Administration and Design, Congestion Management, and Interregional Coordination.   
23 Id. at 2.  
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generation.24  Regional control was further aimed at increasing connectivity between the various 
utility facilities and increasing reliability of the system as a whole, as generation resources from 
across a wider area could be used to balance supply and demand (load).  All of these changes were 
also found to be necessary to create a regulatory structure that would support deregulated 
electricity sales and encourage competition.25
At the time of Order 2000, FERC stated that it held “specific authorities and responsibilities under 
the Federal Power Act to protect against undue discrimination and remove impediments to 
wholesale competition,” however, it stated that it was favoring a more “open collaborative process 
that relies on voluntary regional participation to design [regional transmission operators] that can 
be tailored to specific needs of each region.”
   
26  FERC’s deferential position may have been 
motivated by a philosophical desire to allow different regions to tailor their transmission 
organizations to local needs, or it may have been a tacit acceptance of the superior legal and 
political power held by local utilities and state regulators.  In either case, the regional 
organizations called for by FERC remain voluntary, and today, several years later, a number of 
states and regions—particularly in the West and Southeast—have still not set up a regional 
transmission operator as FERC envisioned.27
The foregoing provides a greatly abridged history of the current balkanized U.S. electricity 
infrastructure.  This somewhat fitful development has resulted in the grid constraints that exist 
today: interconnection between the three main grids is largely limited to a few low capacity lines, 
and electricity redistribution between the three different grids is not presently possible.
  
28  As a 
result, generated electricity cannot be balanced between the West, East, and Texas grids.29  
Further, there exist only seven of the domestic regional transmission operators (regional 
transmission operators and independent system operators) that FERC encouraged in Order 2000 
which manage transmission facilities in their specific geographic regions.30  At least one-third of 
the United States does not contain a regional transmission grid operator at all.31
                                                        
24 Id. at 3.  
  Finally, 
interconnection between the existing regional operators is limited, so even if multiple regional 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 8-9.  
27 THE ISO/RTO COUNCIL, 2009 STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT at 5 (hereinafter IRC Report), 
available at http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/{5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-
003829518EBD}/2009%20IRC%20State%20of%20Markets%20Report.pdf 
28 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Energy in Brief - What is the electric power grid, and what 
are some challenges it faces?, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/power_grid.cfm.  
29 Id.  
30 IRC Report, supra note 27, at 5. 
31 Id. 
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operators exist on the same grid (as they do, for example, in the Eastern Interconnection) there is 
limited interconnection between the regional operators themselves.32
In sum, these attributes combine to create a circumstance where certain areas of the country 
feature mostly deregulated electricity markets with regionally controlled transmission facilities 
that participate in joint planning efforts for electric transmission infrastructure.  In those areas, 
regional organizations provide more open access to the grid for non-utility electricity generators 
(like wind and solar farm operators) and play a leading role in the planning and development of 
new transmission facilities.  Other areas of the United States, by contrast, continue to look like the 
amalgamation of utility-controlled monopolies of forty years ago, with transmission planning 
primarily focused on individual utility areas.    
   
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
The additional issue of risk of grid failure requires mention as it factors into the broader debate as 
to whether transmission facilities require additional control and oversight from a centralized 
regulatory body.  This risk is heightened as a result of the structure of the current grid which, even 
though it is highly balkanized, is more tied together than at any point in history.  A more 
interconnected network carries unique risks of failure because demand loads and generation 
supply must be perfectly balanced across a vast transmission network in order to maintain 
electricity delivery.33  When problems arise with transmission facilities in one part of the grid, this 
balance can become unstable, causing large swaths of the network to fail, leading to power 
outages across the grid.34
Addressing this problem of reliability necessitates that utilities determine how to set universally-
accepted standard operating procedures for an interconnected system, in addition to determining 
how the system itself is constructed.  The challenge presented in setting these standards—and 
gaining broad acceptance on the structure of the future system—is in some respects reminiscent of 
  Such concerns are classified within the utility industry as issues falling 
within the broad category of reliability, and can be exacerbated by the connecting together and 
balancing of disparate transmission facilities from different utilities. 
                                                        
32 IRC Report, supra note 27, at 28-31. 
33 See COMMENTS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL, INTERSTATE ELECTRIC 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM ELECTRIC RELIABILITY ISSUES - NOTICE OF INQUIRY at 3-6, available at 
http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/pubs/DOE-NOI-comments.pdf (forecasting that a future grid failure was 
only a matter of time based on the increased risks presented by an increasingly interconnected grid.  See 
footnote 34, below for the realization of that forecast).  
34 In 2003, for example, a transmission outage in Ohio caused a cascading failure in the grid that caused 
outages for 50 million customers running from Michigan to New York and into Canada.  The total cost of the 
outage in the U.S. was estimated at between $4 billion and $10 billion.  See, U.S.-CANADA POWER SYSTEM 
OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at 1, available at http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/blackout/ch1-
3.pdf. 
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the slow progress being made in establishing regional transmission operators, i.e., independent 
utilities do not always want to cede control of their business practices to a centralized regulatory 
entity.  This resistance to adopting new standards is reasonable from the perspective of the 
individual utilities as they presumably have found a set of transmission facilities and operating 
standards that have worked well enough for their service area.  Once the risks are multiplied in an 
interconnected system, where one outage can shut down a huge network of transmission lines, 
such individualized protocols may be insufficient. 
Congress sought to address this problem of standardization and planning in the Energy Power Act 
of 2005.  Among its other provisions, Congress tasked FERC with the responsibility of 
designating an Electric Reliability Organization that would establish a set of mandatory guidelines 
and operating procedures.35  Unsurprisingly, FERC chose the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation, a non-profit corporation created by utility companies in 1968 to provide voluntary 
standards of the type that Congress was now requiring to be mandatory.36  As reorganized after 
being designated by FERC, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation is now a self-
regulating, non-profit corporation tasked with regulating the bulk power systems in the U.S. and 
Canada, subject to continuing—and now enhanced—oversight from FERC.37  It monitors and 
forecasts reliability throughout the transmission grid and has the power to levy fines against 
utilities that do not meet its required operating procedures.38
The existence of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, and its newly found 
regulatory powers, presents an additional layer of complexity in the debate over the future of 
planning and management in the transmission grid.  While this corporation unquestionably holds 
the power to set operating standards and levy fines against utilities not meeting its standards, that 
power may not be enough to ensure reliability in an unsystematically developed grid 
infrastructure.  And, the problem of ensuring reliability will arguably become more difficult as 
federal and state governments push to add very significant levels of centralized renewable energy 
resources in the next few years.  Incorporating such centralized generation sources onto the grid is 
not likely possible without significant transmission build-out and far greater interconnection 
among the current facilities, thus potentially raising risks throughout the system.  Separately, the 
intermittent generation attributes of renewable generation present their own unique problems in 
maintaining reliability across the grid.  Thus, it remains a live question whether a more federally-
      
                                                        
35 H.R. 6, Electricity Modernization Act of 2005, amending the Federal Power Act, codified as16 U.S.C. 
824 et seq., available at http://www.epa.gov/oust/fedlaws/publ_109-058.pdf.  
36 Press Release, National Electric Reliability Council, NERC Approved as the United States Electric 
Reliability Organization (July 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/PressReleases/PR_072006_NERC_Named_ERO.pdf.  
37 See NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, at 1-2, available at 
http://www.nerc.com/files/2008-Annual-Report.pdf.  
38 Id. at 3-6.  
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controlled grid is necessary to ensure reliability throughout the three grids.  The following case 
example provides a look at what part these problems played in the planning and management of 
one of those grids, and what implications that experience holds for the rest of the nation.   
a) Case Example: Transmission Planning in the Texas Interconnection 
 
This part analyzes current planning through the prism of the Texas Interconnection.  Texas, as 
mentioned in the introduction, is a unique state in the realm of electricity transmission.  It contains 
a mostly deregulated electricity market with nation-leading renewable energy production and a 
grid that nearly encompasses Texas but includes no other states.39  This nearly single-state area is 
relevant, in part, because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission only holds specific 
jurisdiction to regulate electricity sales within a grid where an electron is likely to have crossed 
state lines at some point within the transmission process40 and, as a result, does not regulate most 
of the electricity sales conducted within the state of Texas.41  Thus, it may be somewhat surprising 
that seventy-five percent of the land area of Texas is regulated by a single regional transmission 
operator and market (The Electricity Reliability Council of Texas) of the kind envisioned by 
FERC when it issued Order 2000.42  That concentrated regulatory jurisdiction is likewise matched 
by the existence of a single state regulatory entity—the Public Utility Commission of Texas.43  
Most states, even where a regional transmission operator has been established, share an electrical 
grid and system operator with multiple states, each of which has its own state regulatory entity 
with its own institutional objectives.44
Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard 
  In terms of electricity transmission, Texas truly is close to 
being its own country, making it a good comparison case for planning issues that are present 
nationwide.   
The introduction observed that there is a strong political will to develop centralized renewable 
generation resources in the United States.  One way for legislators to express that will is to pass a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard which sets a target for the amount—set as an aggregate megawatt 
                                                        
39 See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, supra note 14. 
40 See FERC Order 888, supra note 19, at 38,961 (observing that the interstate commerce question “does 
not turn on whether the contract path for a particular power or transmission sale crosses state lines, but rather 
follows the physical flow of electricity”); Florida Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 
U.S. 453, 458, 463 (1972) (finding, where Florida Power & Light Company was not “directly involved in 
power exchanges with Georgia,” that FERC (then the Federal Power Commission) had jurisdiction because 
energy from Florida Power & Light “commingled” with energy from another utility within Florida, which 
interconnected with Georgia Power Co.).   
41 16 U.S.C. Sec. 824 et seq.  
42 See ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT at 3, available at 
http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2009/ERCOT%202008%20Annual%20Report.pdf  
43 See Public Utility Regulatory Act, Title II, codified as TEX. UTILITIES CODE ANN. Sec. 11.002(c), 
available at http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/statutes/Pura09.pdf. 
44 See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability, supra note 14.  




C e n t e r  f o r  G l o b a l  E n e r g y ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A r b i t r a t i o n ,  a n d  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  L a w  
 
7 
goal or a specified percentage of all electricity generation—of renewable generation that a state 
seeks to achieve. Texas’s experience with setting a renewable portfolio standard illustrates the 
process of bridging the divide between a desire for deploying centralized renewable energy on one 
hand, and the reality and constraints of the existing transmission infrastructure on the other. 
In 1999, Texas legislators passed a renewable portfolio standard in Senate Bill 7—which, 
separately, also sought to introduce competition into the retail electric market—and set a goal for 
2,000 megawatts of renewable generating capacity to be installed in Texas by 2009.45  Subsequent 
rapid growth in state-wide renewable energy generation led to the recognition that the goals set in 
1999 would be passed well before the target date.  As a result, in 2005, Senate Bill 20 was 
introduced during the 79th Legislative session and set a goal of an additional 5,000 megawatts, on 
top of the then-existing 880 megawatts of capacity, of new renewable capacity to be installed by 
2015.46  It further included a target of 10,000 megawatts of total renewable electricity generation 
by 2025.47
Similar to the experience with the 1999 bill, however, renewable energy development quickly 
outstripped the state goals.  Texas wind developers alone easily surpassed the added requirement 
of 5,000 megawatts of new renewable generation, and through the third quarter of 2009, Texas 
held 8,797 megawatts of renewable wind generation capacity.
   
48
Competitive Renewable Energy Zones 
  No further legislative additions to 
the state renewable portfolio standard have since been enacted although centralized renewable 
energy development continues apace. 
Perhaps more important than the renewable generation goal was a provision in Senate Bill 20 that 
directed the Public Utility Commission of Texas to designate so-called competitive renewable 
energy zones.49  The basic idea was that the Commission would establish geographic zones within 
the state where future transmission facilities would be the built with the intention of sending 
renewable energy generation (primarily from wind) from windy rural areas to urban load centers.50
                                                        
45 Codified as TEX. UTILITIES CODE ANN. § 39.904 (Vernon supp. 2006). 
  
These legislatively directed zones were the planning mechanism enacted to create a transmission 
46 Texas Legislature Online, Senate Bill 20 – 79th Legislative Session, available at 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/791/billtext/pdf/SB00020F.pdf.   
47 Id.  
48 AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, Q3 MARKET REPORT 2009, available at 
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/10-20-09_AWEA_Q3_market_report.html. 
49 See, TEX. UTILITIES CODE ANN. § 39.904(g). 
50 ELECTRICITY RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVES FOR 
COMPETITIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES IN TEXAS, available at 
http://www.ercot.com/news/presentations/2006/ATTCH_A_CREZ_Analysis_Report.pdf.  
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infrastructure robust enough to meet the generation goals set by the legislature in the renewable 
portfolio standard.     
Part of the task for the Commission was to determine the most cost-effective and efficient manner 
for adding this transmission infrastructure.51  In July 2007, after nearly two years of dedicated 
studies, the Commission announced and subsequently cited by interim order, five regions located 
in West Texas as the most promising for renewable energy development based on their natural 
wind conditions and proximity to large load centers (cities).52  The interim order called for these 
five regions to be the site of future renewable energy generation with transmission directed to 
urban areas such as Dallas/Fort Worth.53
Subsequently, the Commission released the process requirements for companies to compete to 
build the transmission facilities.
   
54  On September 12, 2008 a group of utilities filed a joint 
proposal with the Commission for the purpose of constructing those facilities, including a map of 
the proposed transmission line routes.55  That proposal—viz. ERCOT Scenario 2 CREZ 
Transmission Plan—was approved by the Commission a few months later on January 29, 2009.56  
In March of 2009, the Commission issued its Final Order for construction of the 2,334 miles of 
345kV transmission lines.57  This is a fast-track project targeted to start in 2010/2011 and set to 
reach completion by 2013; upon completion, it will add an estimated 18,456 megawatts of 
capacity to the present system.58   It carries a maximum budget of $4.93 billion.59
The rapidity with which this project was planned and implemented appears to be attributable, in 
part, to a favorable regulatory circumstance and physical grid structure.  In that respect, the 
Electric Reliability Council of Texas service area provides a benchmark for what a regionally 
managed grid can accomplish in a short period of time.  However, there may be drawbacks in 
moving so quickly as opposition to part of the plan has formed, an issue that is explored in the 
case example in section two.  At any rate, how Texas’s experience factors into the larger debate 
over additional federal control of the transmission grid is likely subject to interpretation.  The 
  
                                                        
51 Id.  
52 See, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, COMPETITIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONE UPDATE, at 
4, available at http://www.ercot.com/meetings/board/keydocs/2007/B1016/Item_06_-_CREZ_Update.pdf.   
53 Id. 
54 Barry Smitherman, Chairman, Public Utility Commission of Texas, Report to House State Affairs 
Committee [hereinafter Smitherman Report], available at http://www.puc.state.tx.us/about/commissioners/ 
smitherman/present/pp/State_Affairs_022409.pdf.  
55 Public Utility Commission of Texas, Docket 35665 - Commission Staff’s Petition for Selection of 
Entities Responsible for Transmission Improvements Necessary to Deliver Renewable energy From 
Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (September 12, 2008) [hereinafter PUC Docket 35665], available at 
http://www.clearviewalliance.org/docs/TexasCREZ-ConsortiumCTPfilingdatedSeptember12_2008.pdf. 
56 Smitherman Report, supra note 34. 
57 Public Utility Commission of Texas, Docket 35665, March 2009. 
58 Id. at 3. 
59 Id. 
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following subpart provides additional context to the question of “federal versus local control” of 
planning and management by reviewing two recent developments with broad national 
implications. 
b) Recent Developments in Planning 
 
There are a number of recent developments in this broad area that deserve coverage, but in the 
interest of brevity only two were chosen.  The first recent development describes an effort to 
increase interconnection between the three U.S. grids that, if successful, may be the first step in 
constructing a grid that is truly national in operation and management.  There is, however, 
burgeoning opposition to a more national approach to transmission management as certain states 
worry about being left out of the process, while others seek to sidestep federal regulation and 
maintain independence.  The second development presented highlights different risks and 
opportunities that exist for individual states even in purely regional planning projects.  For both 
issues, the significant tension centers on which states, utilities, and geographic areas stand to 
benefit most from the build-out and interconnection of the transmission network. 
Tying Together the Three Grids 
On October 13, 2009 Bill Richardson, Governor of New Mexico, formally announced the launch 
of the Tres Amigas LLC project to tie together the three U.S. transmission grids.60  The project 
seeks to build a 5 GW “superstation” in Clovis, New Mexico that would link the three grids and 
allow utility companies to buy and sell power in a market provided by the superstation, and then 
route that electricity to customers throughout the nation.61  As promised, the 22.5 square mile 
superstation would provide additional markets for renewable energy generation nationwide, 
allowing renewable energy generated in one grid to be shipped anywhere in the nation where it 
was needed.62
Whether or not the Tres Amigas project is ultimately built, the obstacles that confront the 
project—as well as the problems it seeks to solve—roughly represent several of the political and 
regulatory problems facing wide-spread interconnection.  First up, on the issue of regulation, the 
project presents the question of whether the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”) 
service area (covered in the case example) could participate in an interconnection project without 
 
                                                        
60 Press Release, State of New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, Clovis-Area Superstation To Send 
NM-Produced Renewable Energy to Customers in Other States (Oct. 12, 2009),  available at 
http://www.governor.state.nm.us/press/2009/oct/101209_01.pdf 
61 ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DISCUSSION MATERIALS - THE TRES AMIGAS SUPERSTATION 
PROJECT, available at http://www.tresamigasllc.com/docs/epri-discussion.pdf (the discussion materials note 
interesting regional grid integration planning efforts in China and Europe). 
62 Id. at 12. 
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coming under the jurisdiction of FERC.  As covered above, FERC does not regulate most of the 
bulk electricity sales in the ERCOT service area because electricity is not shipped across state 
lines.63
Tres Amigas LLC sought to address this obstacle by filing a Petition for Disclaimer of Jurisdiction 
with FERC on December 8, 2009.
  The Tres Amigas project is located in New Mexico which could cause part of the ERCOT 
market to come under FERC jurisdiction. 
64  The petition asked that FERC not exercise jurisdiction over 
the new project on the basis of one of three rationales: (1) by finding that the interconnection does 
not constitute interstate commerce, (2) determining that the design of Tres Amigas does not 
commingle interstate electricity and ERCOT would continue to be a wholly separate electrical 
grid, or (3) allowing an exemption from jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act.65  In providing 
policy support for the petition, the first benefit listed is “providing the developers of renewable 
(and other) generation expanded markets in which to sell their power.”66  It continues on to state 
that “this benefit is particularly important because Tres Amigas will be located adjacent to areas of 
the country that have been identified as among the most promising from the standpoint of 
developing renewable wind, solar and geothermal power.”67  The best wind resources in the nation 
are located along the central United States running from North Dakota down to Texas, and the 
West holds the greatest potential for solar and geothermal generation.68
On March 18, 2010 FERC approved Tres Amigas’ request for authorization to sell transmission 
services at negotiated rates but declined the petition to disclaim jurisdiction.
   
69  The decision to 
keep jurisdiction over the project was not an absolute rejection of the petition; instead, FERC 
narrowly based its rejection on a lack of specific information on how the project would function.70
                                                        
63 See 16 U.S.C. Sec. 824 et seq.   
  
Thus, there remains a strong possibility that FERC could later disclaim its jurisdictional claims 
over the ERCOT market, although the project still faces a long road to construction and 
implementation.  Ironically, the second listed benefit of the project—close proximity to promising 
natural resources and development of a nationwide transmission capability—may presage a 
potential political battle for the Tres Amigas project and other similar future interconnection 
attempts.  From a national interest perspective, the production of renewable energy generation is 
64 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. EL10, Petition for Disclaimer of Jurisdiction of 
Tres Amigas LLC, available at http://www.tresamigasllc.com/docs/Tres-Amigas-petition-for-disclaimer.pdf.  
65 Id. at 2-3.  
66 Id. at 5.  
67 Id.   
68 See National Renewable Energy Laboratory, United States Atlas of Renewable Resources, 
http://www.nrel.gov/gis/maps.html#resource_atlas. 
69 Press Release, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC Approves Negotiated Rates for Tres 
Amigas Transmission Project (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/news/news-
releases/2010/2010-1/03-18-10-E-11.pdf.  
70 Id. 
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arguably best achieved by concentrating generation resources on the geographic areas where 
generation is the most productive and cost-effective.  But for some states not located in an area 
with great renewable potential, a more important goal may be to protect state electricity markets 
from outside competition and not miss the opportunity for job growth and technological leadership 
associated with state-based renewable energy generation. 
Analogous concerns were raised in May of 2009 when a group of eleven governors sent a letter to 
Congress opposing the development of a system of high-voltage transmission lines running from 
the Midwest to the East to deliver low-cost renewable energy (a topic covered in the next section 
on siting).71  The letter argued for local control and regional planning, rather than a nationwide 
approach to solving electricity transmission limitations.72  In the letter, the governors cited as a 
key concern that federal funds would be used to subsidize the build-out of this infrastructure, 
thereby undercutting states’ ability to competitively develop local offshore wind resources.73
The governors’ arguments appear to be a strong reproach to certain federally subsidized 
infrastructure projects that undercut state projects.  However, that argument does not clearly relate 
to a privately funded project like Tres Amigas, as it is neither subsidized nor proposed to directly 
impact ratepayers.  In that respect, the Tres Amigas project may provide an interesting litmus test 
as to whether state governments will support a national goal of generating the lowest-cost 
renewable energy generation available, or seek to pursue more regional interests. 
  
High Stakes for States in Regional Planning 
Even states that possess great renewable energy resources face risks in the regional planning of 
transmission construction.  A significant controversy in the Southwestern Power Pool—the 
regional transmission operator for the states of Kansas, Nebraska and parts of seven other 
states74—during the last half of 2009 highlights one of those risks.  The issue present in the 
Southwester Power Pool, much like the one faced in Texas, was where to build transmission 
facilities that would be used to transport renewable energy generation from rural generation points 
to urban load centers.75
                                                        
71 Letter of the Eastern Governors on Renewables and Transmission Planning, Addressed to United 
States Congress (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090612/testimony_hibbard.pdf. 
  Unlike in Texas, however, the Southwestern Power Pool covers several 
72 Id. at 2.  
73 Id.    
74 SOUTHWESTERN POWER POOL, FAST FACTS at 2, available at 
http://www.spp.org/publications/SPP_Fast_Facts.pdf.  
75 See SOUTHWESTERN POWER POOL, NEXT STEPS FOR EHV OVERLAY at 20, available at 
http://www.spp.org/publications/SPPT-BKGD020609.pdf. 
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states and must balance the political interests of all of these states against any proposed technical 
recommendation for transmission construction.  
The timeline of the controversy developed as follows.  In April of 2009, the Southwestern Power 
Pool announced its list of priority planning projects—those transmission facilities that were slated 
to be built in the very near-term.76  This construction was intended to increase transmission 
reliability across the territory and encourage the development of renewable energy generation 
resources throughout the service area.77  One of the six initially listed projects—the “Spearville-
Knoll-Axtell” line—was a 215 mile, 765kV line projected to run from southwest Kansas north up 
to Nebraska and carried a construction cost of $237 million.78
The board of the Southwestern Power Pool, however, removed this project from the priority list in 
early October of 2009, thereby eliciting a letter of concern from the Governor of Kansas, Mark 
Parkinson.
  
79  In the letter the governor encouraged the board of the Southwestern Power Pool to 
reevaluate their decision and emphasized the importance of the project to the development of 
Kansas’s wind resources.80  The Spearville-Knoll-Axtell line was thought to be especially 
important because the best wind resources in Kansas are located in the sparsely populated western 
part of the state where the line would run.  A few weeks after the governor’s letter, the board of 
the Southwestern Power Pool re-released its list of proposed priority projects and, this time, the 
Kansas line was again included.81
This local controversy carries broader implications because it highlights the circumstance that 
centralized renewable energy development is mostly a zero-sum game in the short-term, i.e., there 
are many magnitudes more of potential renewable energy generation in the United States than can 




                                                        
76 Press Release, Southwestern Power Pool, Portfolio of New EHV Transmission Projects Approved: 
Benefits Will Be Balanced Across SPP Region (April 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.spp.org/publications/Transmission_Project_Portfolio_Approved_4_29_09.pdf. 
  Here, Kansas would have lost a state construction project worth 
$237 million, much of which would have been paid for by increases on the ratebase of electricity 
77 Id.  
78 Id.; ITC GREAT PLAINS, CAPITAL PROJECT PROFILE – SPEARVILLE TO KNOLL TO AXTELL PROJECT 
(KETA PROJECT), available at 
http://www.itcgreatplains.com/pdfs/projects/ska/ITCGP_Profile_KETA_Gen.pdf. 
79 Press Release, State of Kansas Governor Mark Parkinson, Governor urges Southwest Power Pool to 
make transmission project in Kansas a priority (October 22, 2009) (on file with author). 
80 Id.  
81 Press Release, Southwestern Power Pool, SPP Priority Transmission Projects Endorsed Pending 
Further Study, available at http://www.spp.org/publications/SPP_Priority_Projects_Endorsed_10_27_09.pdf. 
82 See, e.g., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Renewable Resource Data Center, Energy Tidbits 
at http://rredc.nrel.gov/tidbits.html [Last Visited November 28, 2009].  
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customers outside the state.83
Both Tres Amigas and the Kansas high-voltage power line projects illustrate the high stakes for 
states in the ongoing transmission build-out.  The friction present in these projects directly 
concerns what level of government—or what administrative body—will be making the decisions 
that determine the future of energy development in individual states.  A similar type of conflict is 
present in decisions on where to place the physical facilities, and on whose land.  The next section 
examines the issues surrounding siting of transmission facilities. 
  More fundamentally, the state would miss an opportunity to become 
an established source of renewable energy generation, including gaining the future construction 
projects necessary to build more generation, rather than importing energy from another state.  That 
is the same type of concern, albeit in a different context, from that expressed by Eastern state 
governors over the build-out of a national transmission infrastructure.     
II. Planning and Siting Transmission Facilities 
 
As might be expected, determinations regarding the physical siting (placement) of transmission 
facilities contain a strong federal-state tension similar to the one present in planning, as planning 
and siting to some degree go hand-in-hand.  In particular, there is a continuing national debate 
concerning whether siting determinations—where to place the actual transmission facilities—
should continue to be exercised at the state level or whether the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission should be granted new jurisdiction and power over those decisions.  The established 
policy has been that individual state authorities assumed all jurisdiction to approve or deny 
permits for the siting and construction of electric transmission facilities, which is one reason why 
the “national grids” are really only an aggregation of state-approved lines and facilities.  That 
arrangement is currently under scrutiny and it is a matter of contention between federal and state 
authorities whether increased grid reliability and rapid grid construction require a centralized 
federal siting authority.   
The Controversy over National Interest Electric Corridors 
The roots of the current debate over siting jurisdiction were set when Congress passed the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, which in part amended section 216 of the Federal Power Act.84
                                                        
83 See Southwestern Power Pool, Next Steps for EHV Overlay, supra note 76; Press Release, 
Southwestern Power Pool, SPP Priority Transmission Expansion Projects Endorsed, Pending Further Study, 
available at http://www.spp.org/publications/SPP_Priority_Projects_Endorsed_10_27_09.pdf.  
  As amended, 
Section 216 directed the Secretary of the Department of Energy to identify congestion and 
84 Section 216(a), Federal Power Act; Section 1221(a), Energy Policy Act of 2005, Codified as 16 
U.S.C. § 824p(a). 
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constraint problems in electricity transmission throughout the nation.85  Constraints are the 
physical or operational barriers that dictate how much electricity each part of the grid can 
transmit.86  Congestion problems, by contrast, roughly refers to limitations in the actual or 
scheduled electricity shipments across a particular part of the transmission infrastructure.87  
Although constraints exist in all parts of the grid, they carry special importance in areas where the 
amount of electricity that needs transmitting far outstrips the capacity of the grid infrastructure—if 
the constrained part of grid cannot handle this electricity then more costly congestion problems 
result.88
Under Section 216(a), the areas that the Secretary of Energy identified as congestion and 
constraint problems could receive the designation of “national interest electric corridors.”  Such a 
designation represented a planning decision in the transmission infrastructure, even though it only 
indicated the broad areas where the Department of Energy thought future transmission facilities 
should be built.   The Secretary of Energy subsequently announced two corridor designations in 
October of 2007: (1) the Southwest Area National Corridor, which covers a wide swath of 
Southern California and part of Western Arizona, and (2) the Mid-Atlantic Area National 
Corridor, which covers most of the eastern seaboard from upstate New York down to Virginia, 
and parts west to Ohio.
   
89
These designations did not lack for controversy for several reasons, foremost because transmission 
planning had always resided with state authorities, not the federal government.  Although the 
Department’s corridor designations did not preempt state action, they were interpreted as an 
opening salvo in determining whether FERC would begin gaining control over the placement and 
planning of future transmission developments.  The Mid-Atlantic corridor, in particular, stirred 
fierce controversy because of the significant potential of this line to degrade the environmental and 
scenic beauty along its route.
   
90
                                                        
85 See 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(2). 
  That route was proposed to run through areas that are subject to 
long-term conservation easements, raising questions as to the relative value of land and cultural 
86 See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY – 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, available at 
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/NETC_ExSum_8Aug08.pdf.  
87 Id. at 1. 
88 Id. at 1-2. For example, if a low cost energy source can not be deployed to meet demand because the 
capacity of a segment of the transmission infrastructure is limited, other resources much be pulled from other 
generation sources.  
89 See U.S. Department of Energy, National Electric Transmission Corridor Report and the Ordered 
National Corridor Designations, http://nietc.anl.gov/nationalcorridor/index.cfm. 
90 See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public Interest and 
Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1897 (2008); Nancy McLaughlin, Condemning Open 
Space: Making Way for National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (Or Not) 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 399 
(2008). Land subject to conservation easements is often attractive to environmentalists and energy companies 
for the same reason: because it is large and contiguous with limited development.  These attributes can 
provide a “path of least resistance” for transmission companies because of the sparse population densities. 
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conservation versus the need to ensure grid reliability and increase renewable energy potential.91
The National Interest Electric Corridor Controversy Continued – Litigation over Siting Authority 
  
There were also general concerns that a federally-controlled process would not include the same 
level of public comment and participation as compared with more local approaches, especially 
since the federal planning decisions would lie with a politically un-accountable administrative 
agency far removed from the influence of local representatives. 
As controversial as the idea of the national interest electric corridors was, the power to approve 
siting within the corridors was the real game.  According to Section 216, FERC was provided with 
the power to approve transmission construction permits within national interest electric corridors 
that it had designated—if the relevant state authority had not acted on the permit application for 
over one year after the filing, or was unable to act upon the application.92
A little over a year later, in November of 2006, FERC issued its official rule interpretation for 
Section 216 that deviated from the common understanding.
  Although this was a 
significant new grant of power, both state regulatory bodies and FERC seemingly agreed on the 
meaning of this portion of the statute.  State authorities could still deny any transmission project 
permits that did not meet their criteria. 
93  Under FERC’s official rule 
interpretation, Section 216 actually gave it much broader jurisdiction to approve transmission 
projects within the national interest electric corridors, even where a state authority had already 
denied a construction application.94  Thus, instead of having what is referred to as “backstop” 
siting authority to approve transmission facilities where a state entity had not acted, FERC argued 
that Congress actually gave it the final decision making power for approval of new transmission 
facilities within its designated corridors.95
Two state regulatory entities and two community interest organizations challenged FERC’s rule 
interpretation and, after FERC ruled against them, were joined by many other petitioners in suing 
  This was a contentious interpretation of the statute that 
would significantly alter the balance of power between FERC and the respective state regulatory 
bodies.  If this interpretation won out, FERC would have the power to plan the transmission 
network through electric corridor designations, and the power to approve permits for construction 
within those corridors—FERC would essentially control the whole transmission development 
process.   
                                                        
91 Id.  Everything from civil war battlegrounds to national conservation preserves are included in the 
designated areas.  
92 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(C)(i). 
93 Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission Facilities, 119 
FERC P 61,154 (2007). 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
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FERC in federal court.96  The 4th Circuit received the resulting consolidated litigation, styled as 
Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC.  In Piedmont, the primary argument regarded the 
statutory language that granted FERC authority to approve siting permits where a state had 
“withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing of [a permit] application.”97  FERC argued 
that the word “withheld” used in this language also included the meaning “denied,” while the 
petitioners argued that such an interpretation violated the plan meaning of the statute.98  The 4th 
Circuit found that FERC’s interpretation was nonsensical in the context of the statute and swiftly 
ruled for the petitioners on the question of siting authority; on January 19, 2010, the Supreme 
Court declined to review the 4th Circuit’s decision.99
The Immediate Aftermath of the Piedmont Litigation 
 
The 4th Circuit’s Piedmont decision was rendered in February of 2009 but the court ruling only 
marked ground in the larger battle.  A month later, the acting chairman of FERC, Jon Wellinghoff, 
testified before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources asking that FERC be 
granted the siting powers it had argued before the 4th Circuit that it already held.100  Chairman 
Wellinghoff argued that the national objectives of greatly increasing renewable energy generation 
and ensuring grid reliability required a federal approach to planning, siting, and cost allocation.101  
In his testimony, Chairman Wellinghoff did not dispute the need to concurrently develop 
distributed generation sources—such as regional and local geothermal, solar, and wind—but 
instead argued that a national infrastructure program was also needed.102
Following the Chairman’s congressional testimony, in May of 2009, a group of eleven governors 
from Eastern states running from Maine to Virginia wrote an open letter to Congress arguing 
against providing FERC with the power to determine planning and siting decisions.
  
103
                                                        
96 Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009).  
  In the 
letter, the governors strenuously objected to a national transmission infrastructure that shipped 
97 Id. at 312.  
98 Id. at 313.   
99 Edison Electric Institute v. Piedmont Environmental Council, U.S., No. 09-343, certiorari denied, 
1/19/10.  
100 Testimony of Acting Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Before the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Hearing on Legislation Regarding 
Electric Transmission Lines (March 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20090312100013-03-12-09-testimony.pdf.  
101 Id. at 2-3.  
102 Id. at 2 (“Certainly, developing local renewable energy and distributed resources is also important as 
we expand our capacity to generate clean power, but that is a separate issue from, and is not a substitute for, 
developing the EHV transmission infrastructure that I describe above and the related feeder lines that will 
interconnect renewable energy resources to the transmission grid.”).  
103 Letter from the Eastern Governors on Renewables and Transmission Planning, Addressed to United 
States Congress (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090612/testimony_hibbard.pdf. 
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power from the Midwest to the East Coast but would be paid for by customers throughout the 
nation.104  The governors argued that such a system would constrict their states’ ability to develop 
renewable energy resources.105  Instead, the governors voiced support for a regionally-controlled 
approach to developing electricity generation that would allow their states to move forward with 
their own generation projects.106  In June of 2009, Paul Hibbard, the Chairman of the Department 
of Public Utilities for Massachusetts, echoed these arguments in testimony to two key 
congressional committees, adding the argument that a national grid system to ship power from the 
Midwest to the East Coast—paid for by all customers—was anathema to free market capitalism 
and open competition.107
The Legislative Outlook for Planning & Siting Jurisdiction 
  
The outcome of this legislative politicking is not yet clear as the details of a new climate bill being 
drafted by John Kerry, Lindsey Graham, and Joseph Liberman have not, at the time of this 
writing, been released; the bill is expected to be introduced in April of 2010.108  As a point of 
reference, the previous failed climate bill submitted by Senators Barbara Boxer and John Kerry 
did not address FERC’s siting and planning jurisdiction at all,109 whereas a likewise defeated 
competing house climate bill written by Representatives Henry Waxman and Edward Markey 
would have significantly amended Section 216 of the Federal Power Act.110  The 
Waxman/Markey bill contained language that directed FERC to establish national electricity grid 
standards and support and participate—if invited—in the regional planning processes conducted 
by regional planning entities.111
Transmission planning under the Waxman/Markey bill would have still developed from sub-
regional requirements and plans reflecting individual utility service areas, although FERC would 




                                                        
104 Id.  
  Future transmission planning would have likely required additional involvement 
by FERC—and new opportunities for FERC to participate in planning decisions when asked—but 
105 Id.  
106 Testimony of Paul J. Hibbard, Chairman of Public Utilities, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, before 
the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090612/testimony_hibbard.pdf. 
107 Id.  
108 Kevin Sieff, Senators Work on Bipartisan Climate Bill, Financial Times Online (Mar. 29, 2010). 
109 See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, (2009), available at 
http://kerry.senate.gov/cleanenergyjobsandamericanpower/pdf/bill.pdf.  
110 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454 (2009), Subtitle F – Transmission 
Planning at 172, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h2454pcs.txt.pdf.   
111 Id. at 173. 
112 Id. at 178.  
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overall the process would have remained largely controlled by individual states.  How that would 
have affected the incorporation of the national electricity grid standards is uncertain.  The 
Waxman/Markey bill would also have given FERC additional power to approve applications for 
transmission construction in states located in the Western Interconnection but nowhere else in 
nation.113  FERC could have authorized transmission construction projects even where an 
individual state authority denied the application, but the bill provided limitations on this power, 
including that the project must be a multi-state facility.114
Forecasts on how the climate change debate will factor on FERC’s siting power remain 
speculative.  Whether the current climate bill reflects the Waxman/Markey provisions concerning 
FERC’s jurisdiction is uncertain.  At present, what can be said is that FERC only holds “backstop” 
siting power for determining the location of new transmission facilities and cannot override a state 
authority’s denial of a construction permit.
     
115
Eminent Domain and the Transmission Build-out 
  The debate over the actual content of the climate 
bills will determine whether this circumstance changes, along with many others.  
A separate level of tension exists for individual landowners in the siting of electrical transmission 
facilities, as much of the land that is needed for huge infrastructure projects must be condemned 
and taken by eminent domain.  Energy easements are a classic example of a private-to-private land 
taking, in which energy companies are empowered, under the Federal Power Act, to take 
privately-owned land.116  Unless state law grants relief, the landowner still has to pay taxes on the 
condemned land, while the energy company—which received the land via government 
sponsorship—does not.117
FERC does not keep official figures tracking the amount of land taken by energy companies 
through the facility of eminent domain.  The use appears pervasive, however, even in projects 
FERC cites to illustrate the insignificant use of eminent domain.  For example, FERC highlights 
one specific project on its website where a 700-mile gas line that ran primarily over public lands 
only required a little over 1% of the land to be taken via eminent domain.
   
118
                                                        
113 Id. at 180-181.  
  In practice, this 
114 Id. at 180.  
115 See Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d 304, at 320.   
116 16 USCS § 824p(e) (Federal Power Act § 216 was codified by the Energy Power Act of 2005). 
117 If there is any conflict between local zoning laws and the transmission line siting, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s interpretation trumps local law.  If there is a problem with erosion or maintenance 
of the right of way, FERC directs affected landowners to contact the energy company first.  See 16 USCS § 
824p(e); FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO THE FERC ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION 
FACILITY PERMIT PROCESS at 9 (on file with author). 
118 FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO THE FERC ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION 
FACILITY PERMIT PROCESS at 2 (on file with author).  
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means that the project still required over 7 miles of eminent domain takings for what was, 
primarily, a gas line built over public lands.    
As in other circumstances where eminent domain is a near certainty, private landowners are aware 
that declining to sell their property outright will lead to a forced sale.  This helps to ensure that 
actual takings through eminent domain are more limited, as landowners know they cannot 
ultimately prevent their land from being taken.  Although federal law requires that “fair market 
compensation” be paid to the landowner, the purchase amount is negotiated in the shadow of the 
power of eminent domain.119  If the owner insists on too high of a price and cannot agree with the 
energy company, the land will be taken by force of eminent domain, and the purchase price will be 
administratively determined.  The land taken for transmission infrastructure is substantial—on 
average, a utility easement for a high-voltage transmission line will be one hundred and fifty feet 
wide and will carry significant use and access restrictions.120
a) Case Example: Siting Opposition in the Texas Interconnection 
  Opposition to forced sales and 
eminent domain are just one reason why landowners seek to oppose some transmission 
construction projects, as the following case example illustrates.   
 
As described in the first part of the Texas case example, the Public Utility Commission of Texas 
was tasked by the legislature with determining the best location to build transmission facilities for 
the transport of renewable energy generation.121  The Commission subsequently conducted nearly 
two years of studies and eventually designated five regions as being the best suited for renewable 
energy generation and transmission to urban load centers.122  A group of utilities then submitted a 
proposal for building those facilities, including the proposed routes of the transmission 
facilities.123  The Commission accepted that proposal and a construction timeline was set that was 
to begin in late 2009.124
That preliminary planning process and construction timeline did not survive the actual 
implementation, which required the taking of private land through the use of forced buyouts, or 
the use of eminent domain, in order to build the actual transmission facilities.
  
125
                                                        
119 16 USCS § 824p(f). 
  Instead, 
120 The average width of utility easements for transmission infrastructure line projects is between 100 
and 200 feet.  FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO THE FERC ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION 
FACILITY PERMIT PROCESS, at 9 (on file with author).  
121 See ELECTRICITY RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVES FOR 
COMPETITIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES IN TEXAS, supra note 50. 
122  See, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, COMPETITIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONE UPDATE, at 
4, supra note 50. 
123 See Smitherman Report, supra note 34.  
124 See PUC Docket 35665, supra note 55. 
125 Id.  
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numerous land owners and environmental groups opposed some of the proposed routes based on 
concerns for scenic integrity and the threat of environmental degradation.126  Calculated from the 
number of miles of transmission lines and the required 200 foot right-of-ways, it is estimated that 
56,581 acres of wildlife habitat will be affected by this project.127
Not all of the transmission facilities are slated for construction in highly sensitive areas, and there 
are several utilities building the different segments of the project.  Because of the divergent 
projects and impacts, the Public Utility Commission split its regulatory docket covering the total 
project into several individual dockets that each has unique concerns.
   
128  For instance, the Texas 
Hill Country transmission route—located in the scenic McCamey area of West Texas—is being 
built by the Lower Colorado River Authority.129  That particular route cuts through a culturally 
and environmentally important part of the state, and opposition to the route has been strong.130  
Not only is the specific route a matter of dispute but also the type of facilities—e.g., monopole 
versus lattice towers—that are to be implemented is a point of disagreement.131  At present, the 
Public Utility Commission has stated that it will review the proposed route proposal in July of 
2010, thereby pushing back its original deadline by several months.132
As discussed in the first section on planning, the rapidity with which this project was approved is, 
in part, due to the stream-lined regulatory structure in the state of Texas.  That rapid deployment 
potentially carries a cost, however, as it risks disenfranchising members of the public that would 
be likely to form opposition groups.  For residents and businesses in the tourist destination of the 
Texas Hill Country there is great importance in where the transmission facilities are located in the 
current construction—and how those facilities will look when completed—because their 
appearance is likely to be a part of the landscape well into the foreseeable future.  Although these 
issues are contentious, they are not strictly intractable.  Spending money on better looking 
facilities and less intrusive transmission routes would alleviate a good deal of the opposition.  The 
difficulty lies in allocating the financial and aesthetic burden of these projects onto the respective 
interested parties.  
 
                                                        
126 Id. 
127 Lorie Woodward Cantu, Texas High Wires – A Balancing Act for Private Landowners,  
TEXAS WILDLIFE at 26 (July, 2009), available at http://texas-
wildlife.org/files/Texas%20High%20Wires%20article,%20electronic%20copy,%206-12-09.pdf.  
128 Public Utility Commission of Texas, Docket 35665, Item 1391. 
129 Public Utility Commission of Texas, Docket 35665, Item 1395.  
130 See, e.g., Clear View Alliance, http://www.clearviewalliance.org/; Save Our Scenic Hill Country 
Environment, http://www.soshillcountry.org/index.html; Hill Country Alliance, 
http://hillcountryalliance.org/HCA/Home; Save the Lampasas River, http://www.savethelampasas.org/.    
131 See Bill Neiman, Monopoles Versus Lattice Towers: LCRA Ignores Public’s Request, CLEARVIEW 
ALLIANCE, available at http://www.clearviewalliance.org/docs/MonopolesversusLatticeTowersfinal.pdf 
(citing the use of monopoles in other transmission installations in Texas and throughout the nation). 
132 Id. at 2. 
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b) Other Recent Developments in Siting 
 
The following two developments were chosen because, in addition to being timely, they further 
illustrate the contrast between the sometimes divergent goals of local communities and the state 
and federal agenda for increasing potential renewable energy development.  That development is 
important, as it necessarily results in new transmission facilities in the short-run.  
Scenic Integrity Issues 
In October of 2009, the Kansas Supreme Court released an opinion in a controversy concerning 
whether the county of Wabaunsee could ban the placement of “Commercial Wind Energy 
Conversion Systems” (large commercial wind farms) within county lines.133  The plaintiffs’ side 
of the action featured land owners who had entered into written contracts for the development of 
commercial wind farms, as well as interveners who owned wind rights throughout the county.134   
The defendants were the three members of the Board of County Commissioners that created the 
zoning regulations banning the creation of commercial wind farms.135
The chronology of the dispute began in 2002, as the county zoning administrator reported to the 
Board of County Commissioners that there was a company interested in building a commercial 
wind farm in the county.
    
136  Like many counties throughout the nation, Wabaunsee did not have 
any zoning regulations specifically treating wind farms, so the Board decided to place a 
moratorium on development, and soon thereafter it directed the county planning commission to 
review and recommend updates to the County Comprehensive Plan.137  One of the 
recommendations in the updated Comprehensive Plan was “[to] maintain the rural character of the 
county with respect to its landscape, open spaces, scenery, peace, tranquility, and solitude.”138  
That recommendation carried special meaning because Wabaunsee County is the site of part of the 
Flint Hills, a culturally and environmentally significant location where much of the remaining 
virgin Tallgrass Prairie in the U.S still exists.139
                                                        
133 See Zimmerman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 218 P.3d 400 (Kan. 2009), also available at 
http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/Opinions/SupCt/2009/20091030/98487.pdf. 
   
134 Id.  
135 Id.   
136 Id. at 405. 
137 Id. at 405-406. 
138 Id. at 406. 
139 See, e.g., Verlyn Klinkenborg, Splendor of the Grass, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, April 2007, 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/04/tallgrass-prairie/klinkenborg-text; Betsy Rubiner, Old Kansas, 
Still Growing Tall, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2007, 
http://travel.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/travel/escapes/04American.html?8dpc.  At one time, over 140 million 
acres of prairie covered the U.S. but only 4% of that amount is still estimated to exist and most of that 
amount exists in the Flint Hills.   
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In April of 2004, after the planning process, the Board adopted the planning commission’s 
recommendations and scheduled a separate meeting to discuss amending specific zoning 
regulations regarding small and commercial wind farms.140  After that meeting, in June, the Board 
accepted the regulations proposed by the county planning commission for small wind turbines 
(distributed wind turbines intended for single-home use) but overrode the planning commission’s 
proposed regulation of commercial wind farms.  Instead of agreeing to regulate, the Board voted 
2-1 to entirely prohibit commercial turbines from being placed within the county, citing several 
reasons, including that the turbines would be “incompatible with the rural, agricultural, and scenic 
character of the County.”141
Plaintiffs subsequently sued the Board on a number of different theories.  These included that the 
regulation was unreasonable, or that it represented a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.
 
142  The interveners later sued on the additional theory of “inverse condemnation,” 
i.e., a theory that the Board’s regulation banning placement of wind turbines was so severe that 
they prevented the interveners from using their property for any economically beneficial 
purpose.143
On October 30, 2009, the Kansas Supreme Court released its opinion in which it found that the 
Board’s decision to ban commercial wind turbines easily met the reasonableness standard.  
Although the court declined to state its standard of review, it did state that the Board was within its 
power to base their land use decision on the basis of aesthetics/scenic integrity and the wishes of 
some residents.
   
144  The takings and inverse condemnation claims are still pending as both parties 
have been invited to give oral arguments on these U.S. constitutional matters; in all other matters 
the Board was successful.145
The Zimmerman case addresses several interesting issues for renewable energy and, potentially, 
for large-scale transmission line build-out.  In short, the Kansas Supreme Court found that a 
county could ban an energy generation source on the basis of a land use ordinance.  Whether a 
similar land use ordinance could prevent transmission facilities from being installed is uncertain.  
Generation is arguably a more local endeavor that does not affect a wide area, whereas 
transmission facilities, especially at the current time, are the tie that connects vast areas.  On the 
other hand, there exists a strong argument that a state or local area should have the flexibility to 
determine how to meet its energy demands and not be forced into supporting the nation’s 
 
                                                        
140 Zimmerman, 218 P.3d 400 at 406.  
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 409. 
143 Id. at 408.  
144 Id. at 416. 
145 Id. at 431-432.  
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transmission infrastructure at the expense of local cultural and environmental assets.  That desire 
for some local control over new infrastructure projects is analogous to the concerns expressed by 
Eastern state governors in opposition to the national corridor project, discussed above.   
As a practical matter many of these concerns may end up being isolated to culturally or 
environmentally sensitive projects.  The recent development of the governor of Kansas fighting to 
keep a high-voltage transmission line project in state (discussed in section one) may typify the 
need for states to compete for huge infrastructure projects in order to gain the construction jobs, 
tax revenues, and opportunity to export energy.  Because of the strong economic considerations, it 
is nearly a forgone conclusion that the transmission build-out will result in tens of thousands of 
miles of previously open space being crisscrossed with high-voltage power lines.  The lines 
themselves may need to bend their path, however, in deference to local opposition.    
New Siting Process on Federally Owned Land 
Local opposition is less of an issue when the federal government owns all of the land in question.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that a new and different process for siting transmission facilities on 
federal lands was announced in October of 2009.  This parallel process came about in the form of 
a Memorandum of Understanding (“Memorandum”) signed by the Departments of Defense, 
Energy, Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce, and the Council on Environmental Quality, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation.146  The purpose behind the Memorandum is to stream-line the 
administrative process for siting and construction of transmission projects over federal land that 
are used to support renewable energy generation. 147  The federal lands that are the subject of this 
memorandum do not include those situated within the National Interest Electric Corridors 
discussed in the first part of this section.148
Under the terms of the Memorandum, the Department of Energy will designate a single point of 
contact, a “Lead Agency,” for a project that falls under the purview of the agreement.  That 
designation will be roughly based on which agency carries the most significant land management 
interests related to the project, or is recommended by other impacted agencies.
 
149
                                                        
146 See Memorandum of Understanding Among the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Dept. of Commerce, Dept. 
of Defense, Dept. of Energy, Envtl Protection Agency, The Council on Envtl Quality, the Fed. Energy Reg. 
Commission, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and the Dept. of the Interior, Regarding 
Coordination in Federal Agency Review of Electric Transmission Facilities on Federal Land (Oct. 23, 2009), 
available at http://www.achp.gov/docs/TransmissionMOU.pdf.  
  The Lead 
Agency then has the responsibility of coordinating action among the various agencies and 
147 Id. at 1-2.  
148 Id. at 3.  
149 Id. 
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establishing and efficient permitting schedule.150  Importantly, the Lead Agency will maintain a 
consolidated administrative record regarding the permitting decision and will prepare a unified 
environmental review document under the National Environmental Policy Act.151
The effect of this Memorandum is likely to be of strongest import in Western states that feature 
large amounts of public land.  It might also carry broader significance by providing a window into 
what a transmission siting process looks like that is divorced from contentious issues of 
federalism, like those covered in the other subparts of this section.  In that respect, the siting 
process under the Memorandum may present an operating blueprint for what a more federalized, 
FERC controlled siting process might look like, and a harbinger of things to come if FERC wins 
its legislative or judicial siting battles.  
   
III. Introduction to the Smart Grid 
 
Because this paper is meant as an introduction to the area of transmission, many issues relevant to 
a fuller understanding of the grid—such as cost allocation and cost recovery—have been excised 
for the sake of brevity.  There is one general topic that requires at least brief treatment.  Thus, this 
final section provides a basic introduction to the Smart Grid, which in some respects represents an 
alternate technological path from large-scale transmission development. 
The Smart Grid – Developments in the Electricity Distribution Network  
The Smart Grid broadly refers to a basket of technological advancements that are being developed 
for the distribution level of the grid, i.e., the numerous low-voltage power lines and facilities that 
carry electricity from substations to individual houses.  Up until this point, by contrast, this paper 
has focused on the transmission level of the grid, where high-voltage lines carry electricity from 
far-away power plants to nearby substations.  Both levels of the grid are undergoing frenetic 
change.  At the distribution level, utilities and software companies want distribution facilities to do 
more than carry electricity to the end consumer and record its consumption.  They are investing 
heavily to that end—Pike Research, a consultancy firm for the field of clean tech, estimates that 
over $200 billion will be invested worldwide in Smart Grid technologies by 2015.152
                                                        
150 Id. at 5.  
  The federal 
government is, again, seeking to capitalize on this investment and, to that end, the Commerce 
Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology recently finalized its first set of 
151 Id. at 6.  
152 Pike Research, Smart Grid Investment to Total $200 Billion Worldwide by 2015, PIKE RESEARCH, 
http://www.pikeresearch.com/newsroom/smart-grid-investment-to-total-200-billion-worldwide-by-2015.  
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technical standards for the smart grid, which, if adopted by FERC, could greatly accelerate the 
pace of adoption.153
The enabler underlying many Smart Grid technologies is the advanced metering infrastructure 
program which is intended to create a network of digital smart meters with enhanced 
communication abilities.
 
154  Like traditional utility meters, smart meters record the amount of 
electricity consumed in a particular location but also contain enhanced communication abilities, 
which allow real-time information about consumption to be sent to utility companies and 
customers.  That ability alleviates the need for monthly site visits by utility meter readers and 
service technicians and, more importantly, allows utilities to implement flexible electricity prices 
that change with real-time generation costs.155  Consumers can also use real-time information to 
track price changes and adjust their consumption accordingly, thereby reducing peak electricity 
demand.156  Even small reductions in peak demand can significantly reduce the need for costly 
renewable energy infrastructure projects, such as high-voltage transmission lines.157
Advanced meters also provide the information that utilities require to more adeptly balance load 
demands on the grid, allowing, for example, greater incorporation of two-way power flows.  Two-
way power allows small generation devices—such as rooftop solar panels, geothermal generators, 
and small-wind turbines—to feed excess electricity back onto the grid, which directly reduces the 
owner’s utility bill.  Although distributed generation at high levels can cause grid stability 
problems, the real-time information provided by advanced meters—and the more advanced 
software modeling and control programs it supports—can mitigate those problems to some extent.  
 
Because greater levels of distributed energy generation and higher levels of energy efficiency 
roughly correspond with fewer power generation plants, the Smart Grid is sometimes viewed as a 
competitor to the huge transmission infrastructure build-out.  The enormity of the energy 
challenges facing the U.S. may require embracing both approaches, however.  And, at any rate, a 
                                                        
153 See Press Release - National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Issues First Release of 
Framework for Smart Grid Interoperability (Jan. 10, 2010). 
154 NATIONAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, NETL MODERN GRID STRATEGY 
POWERING OUR 21ST-CENTURY ECONOMY, ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE at 5, available at 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/moderngrid/docs/AMI%20White%20paper%20final%20021108.pdf.  
155 Id. at 5-9. 
156 See, e.g., Uwe Dulleck and Sylvia Kaufmann, Do customer information programs reduce household 
electricity demand?—the Irish program, 32 ENERGY POLICY 1025 (2004) (empirical study finding that 
consumer education programs decreased electricity demand by 7%). 
157  DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY – THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION, HOW A SMARTER GRID WORKS AS AN 
ENABLING ENGINE FOR OUR ECONOMY, OUR ENVIRONMENT, AND OUR FUTURE at 13, available at 
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages.pdf.  




C e n t e r  f o r  G l o b a l  E n e r g y ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A r b i t r a t i o n ,  a n d  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  L a w  
 
26 
dual-policy approach is currently reflected in administrative action as witnessed by the roughly $4 
billion in grants announced for Smart Grid projects in the last few months of 2009.158
  
 
   
                                                        
158 See Press Release, Department of Energy, President Obama Announces $3.4 Billion Investment to 
Spur Transition to Smart Energy Grid (October 27, 2009); Press Release, Department of Energy, Secretary 
Chu Announces $620 Million for Smart Grid Demonstration and Energy Storage Projects (November 24, 
2009).  
